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Section I: Introduction 
By “coming to terms with life” I mean: the reality of death has become a definite part of 
my life; my life has, so to speak, been extended by death, by my looking death in the eye 
and accepting it, by accepting destruction as part of life and no longer wasting my 
energies on fear of death or the refusal to acknowledge its inevitability. It sounds 
paradoxical: by excluding death from our life we cannot live a full life, and by admitting 
death into our life we enlarge and enrich it.  
-Etty Hillesum, from An Interrupted Life. 
 
 
In the discussion that follows, I explore what I have called, A Self-Deconstructive Ethic. As such 
a title implies, the path that this ethic outlines is one in which its practitioner commits to a 
“letting go of the self.” For we all form self-conceptions—ideas concerning who we 
fundamentally are as individuals. Those ideas form the conceptual basis of what we tend to 
include when we use words like “me,” or “I.” But, just as we might peel back the layers of an 
onion, a self-deconstructive ethic asks us to peel back the layers of assumptions that we take to 
be fundamental in constituting our identity. The motivation for such an account of ethics is most 
certainly derived from Eastern philosophical accounts of the self, or rather, the non-self. This is 
not to say, however, that Western philosophy does not acknowledge the importance of the “non-
self” perspective to a degree. Peter Singer rightly observes: from Jeremy Bentham to Immanuel 
Kant, and from Nagel to Rawls, “Ethics requires us to go beyond “I” and “you” to the universal 
law, the universalizable judgment, the standpoint of the impartial spectator…or whatever we 
choose to call it.”1 So there is a sense in which even Western ethical theory has been involved 
with some form or another of self-deconstruction, or at the very least, a diminishment in the role 
of the self in terms of ethical decision making. Rawls’s original position, for instance, is a 
structural device that is meant to strip away most of our self-defining characteristics so that we 
                                                             
1 Singer, p. 15. 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may derive fair principles of justice.2 While, initially, our Western influences may incite 
suspicion regarding self-deconstructive projects, it is important to acknowledge that the theme of 
self-deconstruction is not an isolated Eastern tradition; rather, in some form, the theme of 
deconstructing the self is a tradition in the study and theory of ethics more broadly.   
In the argument that follows, I will suggest that our capacities for oppression are 
fundamentally connected to the attachments we hold to our self-conceptions, and thus our 
potential of eliminating oppression is found in our capacity to deconstruct our self-conceptions. 
In the first section, I will expand upon this general argument and its approach, providing some 
detail regarding the nature of oppression and how a self-deconstructive ethic might help us 
overcome it. In §3, I will discuss how moral luck plays a role in our pursuit of ending 
oppression. In §4, I will explore the role of our moral capacity for self-reflection in our pursuit of 
self-deconstruction, and I will also discuss how we might apply this ethic beyond an 
interpersonal context of oppression and toward the standards we adopt within our institutions.  
 
 
Section II: Elements of a Self-Deconstructive Ethic 
 
2.1 An Aspiration to End Oppression 
This self-deconstructive ethic is founded on an aspiration: the end to human oppression. 
Thinking about oppression is the starting point of this account. Just as it would be difficult for an 
epidemiologist to eradicate a disease without first knowing the relevant nature of the disease, it 
would be similarly difficult to end oppression without first coming to know oppression; how it 
relates to us and our relationships, and how we can recognize it. The expansive project of 
defining and interpreting the entire phenomenon of oppression is unfortunately beyond the scope 
                                                             
2 Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 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of this particular account. However, I intend to explore certain distinguishing elements of 
oppression that will be sufficient for guiding us in the subsequent project of developing a self-
deconstructive ethic with the aim of ending oppression.  
 First and perhaps most generally, oppression is a consequence of human conduct. This 
point might seem trivially obvious, but it is important because it tells us something quite 
significant concerning what oppression is not. Oppression is not a matter of natural or accidental 
harm. One is not oppressed by the risks and harms that pervade our natural environments. The 
tornado that destroys my house has not oppressed me, but the person who burns my house down 
because of the color of my skin has. The tiger that attacks my family has not oppressed me, but 
the person who harasses my family because of our practicing religion has. Certainly tigers and 
tornadoes can harm human beings, but neither has the potential to oppress human beings. This 
potential is uniquely human. From this observation, we know that oppression is a particular kind 
of human-derived harm. 
 We can draw certain distinctions between oppression and, say, general forms of human 
harm. One defining characteristic, in particular, seems consistently acknowledged across 
different interpretations of oppression. This is the observation that oppression is a kind of harm 
that targets persons on the basis of who they are perceived to be.  As Marilyn Frye puts it, “If an 
individual is oppressed, it is in virtue of being a member of a group or category of people”.3 
Continuing with this point, Iris Marion Young elaborates on the notion of what constitutes the 
term “group,” as she says, “To be in a group is to share with others a way of life that defines a 
person’s identity and by which other people identify him or her.”4 Oppression then, compared to 
more general human-induced harms, has a unique connection to our conceptions of self and 
                                                             
3 Frye, p. 87.  
4 Young, p. 93. 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identity. Oppression entails harms that are caused in virtue of who we perceive others to be: one 
is oppressed in virtue of being a woman, a homosexual, a Muslim. Understanding oppression and 
recognizing it in our own lives will require a critical examination in the kinds of ways that we 
see and define people, and even how we come to define ourselves in relation to others.
 Further, coming to understand oppression will require an understanding of the 
complexities and ambiguities of the dynamic between the oppressor and the oppressed. A 
question we might ask is, what role does each play in contributing to the larger reality of 
oppression? And, as Primo Levi observes in his descriptions of the terrors within Nazi 
concentration camps, the answer to this question is ambiguous: “The world into which one was 
precipitated was terrible, yes, but also indecipherable: it did not conform to any model; the 
enemy was all around but also inside,”5 and he previously remarks that human relationships 
within the camps, “could not be reduced to the two blocs of victims and persecutors.”6 As Levi 
describes, there is a certain sense in which the nature of oppression involves an ambiguity of 
how we might identify victims and oppressors. It seems that, at least in part, we have the great 
capacity, as victims, to contribute to the realities of our own oppression. And, as oppressors, we 
might contribute to our own oppression more than we realize. In the words of Frederick 
Douglass, “The slaveholder is the author of his own subjection. There is more truth in saying, 
that slavery is a greater evil to the master than to the slave, than many, who utter it, suppose.”7 
It would seem that oppression exists and is perpetuated within the hearts and minds of 
both the oppressor and the oppressed victim. We must be careful, as victims of oppression, to 
resist condemning ourselves (e.g. in coming to believe that we are without worth).  Etty 
Hillesum, a Nazi prisoner who recorded her experiences of living within a Jewish ghetto, 
                                                             
5 Italics added. 
6 Levi, p. 83.  
7 Douglass, p. 80. 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describes the victim’s capacity to oppress himself, as she explains, “Humiliation always involves 
two. The one who does the humiliating, and the one who allows himself to be humiliated. If the 
second is missing, that is, if the passive party is immune to humiliation, then the humiliation 
vanishes into thin air.”8 And Hillesum goes on to say, “By our feelings of being persecuted, 
humiliated and oppressed…our greatest injury is one we inflict upon ourselves.” This statement 
is not intended to displace the degree of moral blame we ascribe to the oppressor, and it is not an 
attempt to place unwarranted blame on oppressed people for causing the conditions of their 
oppression. Rather, in realizing that we—the victims of oppression—contribute psychologically 
to our own oppression for all the reasons Hillesum mentions (e.g. in our ability to indulge in our 
humiliation, and to give into the belief that we are lesser) we are empowered with the knowledge 
that at least a part of our subjugation can be diminished if we alter the harmful ways in which we 
perceive ourselves. As bell hooks says, “It is necessary to remember that it is first the potential 
oppressor within that we must resist—the potential victim within that we must rescue—
otherwise we cannot hope for an end to domination, for liberation.”9  
Does this mean that oppression is primarily psychological? Are we capable of being 
oppressed if, as victims, we release ourselves from self-hatred and our feelings of persecution? I 
am not committed to a fully psychological interpretation of oppression. For, at least intuitively, it 
seems that one can still be oppressed whether or not they choose to acknowledge it. However, 
there is power to resist oppression in our own peace of mind and in the compassion we our 
willing to extend to ourselves. So while I hesitate to say that oppression can be fully reduced to 
our psychological dispositions, I think that our own psychology plays a much larger role in the 
perpetuation of oppression than what we might assume.  
                                                             
8 Hillesum, p. 144‐145. 
9 hooks, p. 465. 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An element of oppression that I have left intentionally vague is the distinction between 
interpersonal acts of oppression and systemically derived forms of oppression. It is true that 
oppression, as a form of harm, exists on both of these levels. In instances of interpersonal 
oppression, there is a sense that the harming of others is intended on some conscious level, and 
usually (but not always) the involved parties are in closer proximity with one another. Whereas, 
it is conceivable that one could be completely unconscious of the kinds of systemic forms of 
oppression that one contributes to. For instance, every time I buy coffee at the grocery store, I 
might unknowingly contribute to the oppression and exploitation of farmers living in different 
counties around the world. However, a primary focus of this self-deconstructive ethic, as will be 
discussed, is the reduction or elimination of a person’s internal potential for oppression. 
Therefore the discussion that follows will apply mostly to matters of interpersonal acts of 
oppression. However, another focus of this paper will be to apply the elements of a self-
deconstructive ethic to the standards we adopt within our institutions and the larger organizations 
of society, and here the acknowledgement of oppression as a consequence of systemic structures 
will become more apparent. 
 In this section I have attempted to provide certain key elements of oppression that may 
help us in uncovering an ethic that will guide us in the project of ending oppression. Namely, I 
have concluded that oppression is a human-derived form of harm in which oppressed people are 
targeted on the basis of who they are perceived to be; and further I have suggested that the 
dynamic between oppressor and oppressed victim is such that both play a role in contributing to 
the conditions of their own oppression.  
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2.2 Death and the Motivation for ‘Self’ Preservation 
The fear of death is, undoubtedly, a powerful source of motivation. But what is that we fear? 
Presumably, we see death as an absence of something, so it is then an absence that we fear. And 
that thing, which we are fearful of losing upon death, is, of course, the self. Therefore, the fear of 
death is a fear of the destruction of the self. To say that our fear of the destruction of our selves is 
a powerful source of motivation in our lives is to say that nearly everyone lives with the 
perpetual desire to preserve the self. The implications of this strong desire form the foundation of 
a self-deconstructive ethic.  
 We live with the strong desire to preserve the self, and we fear its destruction. As you 
might assume, and as the title of §2 suggests, the ethic I support is one where we seek to 
deconstruct the self—against our strong desire of self-preservation. So why then, if we have such 
strong desires to preserve the self, should we adopt an ethic that asks us to do exactly the 
opposite of what this internal desire would have us do? We can start to uncover the answer to 
this question once we consider the horrible things even the most ordinary person is capable of 
doing when it is a matter of self-preservation.  
Death, you might say, is the ultimate test of our moral limitations. When we are faced 
with the perceived destruction of our self, we become much more likely to justify actions that 
would be far more difficult to justify when the threat facing the self is not imminent. We might 
justify the forceful taking of each other’s possessions, the taking of each other’s freedoms (in the 
form of imprisonment), violence toward one another, and much more. Now, all of this will 
probably not come as a surprise to most. In fact, I suspect that most people will find these actions 
quite reasonable in circumstances of imminent threat to the self. They might say that killing is 
justifiable when it is necessary to preserve your life; or if someone threatens to kill you, it might 
seem justifiable to do whatever they tell you to do: steal, murder or torture. If making these kinds 
Waldman         Elements of 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of self-preserving choices is not justifiable (in a moral sense), one might reasonably contend that 
they are understandable given the circumstances. My point isn’t to argue whether or not these 
actions are, or can ever be, justifiable or even understandable. My point is only to show that the 
desire to preserve the self is a powerful motivator—so powerful that it has the capacity to 
transform many actions we would normally take to be unjustifiable and make them at least seem 
permissible.  
 Taken by itself, this is a morally worrisome capability: a perceived threat to the self can 
lend an internal justification toward horrible actions—justification for retaliation, inflicting 
violence on another, or letting someone perish instead of offering help. For instance, if a child is 
struggling to stay afloat in a pond, and I was (falsely) led to believe that there are man-eating 
alligators in that pond, I may refuse to offer the child life-saving assistance on the basis of 
preserving my own life. Our motivations for self-preservation become especially morally 
worrisome when we consider what other kinds of things actually end up counting as perceived 
threats to the self. For every person has a conception of the self, or what we also might call an 
identity. This conception is usually a psychological compilation of various qualities, including 
physical characteristics and personality traits. And some qualities associated with our person are 
more intimately connected with our conception of our selves than others—for example, I do 
happen to have blonde hair, but were one to dye my hair brown, I would not consider this too 
significant a change in what it means to be me (although even a loss of this insignificance might 
cause some discomfort). If someone were to strip me of my passion for philosophy, on the other 
hand, I would perceive this as a serious threat to what it means to be me. We should not assume 
that our motivations for self-preservation only encompass our desire to preserve our physical 
bodies. It encompasses whatever we perceive to be a part of our self, our identity. And, if this is 
Waldman 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of 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correct then the circumstances in which we might find ourselves committing harm on the basis of 
self-preservation could end up being dangerously pervasive in our everyday circumstances.   
We would imagine, though, that not everyone would be willing to commit murder as long as 
they are allowed to continue practicing philosophy. And, this might be true even for a person 
who really loves philosophy (or any other interest for that matter). We can also imagine, 
however, a person who would not put up much of a fight if someone tried to kill them (a 
depressed person, for instance)10. The point here is to notice that among people, we will all value 
different things, to varying degrees, when it comes to preserving our selves. Our attachments to 
our selves, or to our conceptions of identity will vary greatly among persons. When a trait is 
perceived to be so integral to our self-conceptions that the threat of losing such a trait triggers 
our self-preserving desires, this trait is rigidly fixed in our identities.  Some people will maintain 
greater or lesser amounts of rigidly fixed traits within their own self-conception. If one has a 
greater amounts of these rigid traits they have, what I call, an excessively rigid identity. Rigid 
identity can be contrasted with fluid identity. Both can be defined as follows:  
1. Rigid Identity: A person exhibiting rigid identity is more likely to perceive any 
particular trait, or group of traits, as fundamental to his own self-conception.  
 
2. Fluid Identity: A person exhibiting fluid identity is less likely to perceive any particular 
trait, or group of traits, as fundamental to their own self-conception.   
Consider this example: Ted has many qualities associated with his person—he is tall, he has 
brown eyes, he is Caucasian and he possesses the trait of being the family breadwinner. His 
perception of his self, however, is rigidly tied to two traits, in particular. For Ted takes great 
pride in his masculinity and his ability to provide for his family. Ted, in a very real sense, sees 
                                                             
10 A self-deconstructive ethics does not advocate suicide. A suicidal person—through either terrible life 
circumstances, harassment or bullying, to name a few examples—might already perceive his identity to be 
destroyed, worthless or beyond repair; and since he already perceives his identity destroyed, he might not be 
deterred from the threat of physical death, it might even seem appealing. A self-deconstructive ethics encourages 
one to realize that identities were never something that defined us in the first place.  
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himself rigidly and explicitly as the man who supports his family. If Ted is threatened with a loss 
of these traits (say his wife shows interest in getting a job), then, as far as he is concerned, his 
self is fundamentally threatened. And given the actions that seem justifiable in light of a 
perceived threat to the self, Ted might act in horrible ways in order to preserve his masculine 
status—abusing his wife to keep her home, or just about any other mean to the end of preserving 
his own self-conceived identity.  
 While at first we may find if more understandable when people do horrible things when 
they act in response to an immediate threat facing their selves; upon further reflection, moral 
worries arise when we consider the vast number of ways in which one might conceive of 
himself, and thus how one might perceive an immediate threat toward himself. It seems at least 
possible that we could form such rigid conceptions of our own identities, that even the most 
mundane events in the world could “trigger” our self-preserving desires. Consider this next 
example. Two men are holding hands and walking down a busy sidewalk. Another man watches 
from afar, and gets angry from just looking at the two men holding hands. Why would the 
onlooker become angry? This scenario, too, can be explained in terms of rigidity of identity and 
our strong desire to preserve the self. The onlooker, who maintains a rigid conception of male 
heteronormativity as a defining characteristic of his own identity, may see the two male partners 
as an external contradiction to his own rigid conception of what is allowed for when it comes to 
male behavior. In this situation, the onlooker has two options: either he can deconstruct his 
existing presumptions of what it means to be a male and allow for a greater (more fluid) realm of 
possibility, or he can reaffirm his existing conceptions, but this requires that he reject the 
external contradiction. A rejection of this type is a commitment to force; force with the intention 
of eliminating or altering the perceived threat, which, in this case, is two men holding hands. Of 
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course, the onlooker may not act on this commitment to force, nevertheless, the commitment to 
change or eliminate the threat still remains in the form of internalized emotions—anger and 
disgust.  
 The case of Ted and the onlooker demonstrate that our strong desires for self-
preservation have the very real potential of pervading the decisions of our everyday life. Neither 
men were in any danger of dying, in the physical sense, yet both men may have been highly 
influenced by what is, essentially, a fear of death. This is because, as I have shown, the fear of 
death is a much more pervasive motivating force in our lives if what we fear is actually a loss of 
our self-conception or our identity. From this perspective, virtually anything can be perceived as 
a threat to the self so long as it yields some contradiction to a trait that we hold to be fundamental 
in our identity. So then, it seems that our potential to oppress is bound in our aversion from the 
loss of our self-conceived identity—our fear of dying. 
 
2.3 Ending Oppression as Ending Our Potential to Oppress 
I should say something briefly regarding how this ethic works toward ending oppression. On this 
account, the aim of eliminating oppression is achieved through eliminating, or working to 
reduce, our potential for oppression. We may never come to know our actual capacity for 
oppression unless we happen to find ourselves in circumstances that test our moral limits. It is 
not enough that we merely believe that we are incapable of oppression. For, we could be wrong 
about this. The best thing to do is to understand our motivations for oppression and their source. 
And, according to this account, it is our identity and our desire for self-preservation that 
substantiate acts of oppression. Thus, our potential for oppression is causally bound with our 
self-conception and our desire for self-preservation. Ridding ourselves of the potential to 
Waldman 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of 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oppress, then, requires a deconstruction of self and an aversion from our desires for self-
preservation. 
 If we were able to fully achieve this aim—of deconstructing the self entirely—it may be 
true that we would rid ourselves of the potential to oppress, but it also seems like we would rid 
ourselves of the desire for self-preservation in the most basic sense: the desire to preserve our 
bodily integrity, the very thing that keeps us alive. Would we have to give this up, too? Perhaps. 
The reality is that sometimes in extreme circumstances we will have to choose between 
preserving our life and conforming to oppressive regimes, for instance. I imagine many people 
made this choice in Nazi Germany. But, for this account to make progress toward ending 
oppression, it is not the case that everyone must be willing to die at a moment’s notice. For, the 
force of this account is in gesturing towards the idea that our desires for self-preservation 
pervade our life in ways that are both mundane and extreme. And we can all make progress in 
suppressing these desires in our everyday circumstances.  
 
2.4 An Ideal Aspiration 
A self-deconstructive ethic is an account with an idealistic aspiration. That is, its aspiration 
hinges on an ideal counterfactual that if we were to be fully successful in deconstructing the self 
then we would be freed from possessing the potential for oppression. This is an ideal 
counterfactual because the truth of the matter is that not many people would be fully capable of 
deconstructing their entire self-conception. And, according to this account, if there exists any 
circumstance in which a person would be willing to defend their self-conception (even our 
conception of bodily integrity) by means of force—whether it be physical or psychological in 
kind—upon another, then that person is not fully freed from their potential for oppression.  
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The possibility that one would be capable of giving up all fear of self-destruction is 
probably not a practical feasibility; although, I should say, perhaps not impossible. In 1963, a 
Buddhist monk named Thich Quang Duc sat down in the middle of a busy Saigon street, covered 
himself in petrol and lit himself on fire. Quang Duc was protesting religious oppression 
occurring in his country. His last testament read as follows, “Before closing my eyes to go to 
Buddha, I have the honour to present my words to President Diem, asking him to be kind and 
tolerant towards his people and enforce a policy of religious equality.”11 It is arguable whether or 
not any good came from his actions, or if his actions could be considered morally justifiable. 
Regardless, Quang Duc felt that he was responding to a grave injustice, and in light of that 
injustice, he took his own life in an unimaginable manner as an ultimate measure of defiance and 
civil protest. Sometimes, we are placed in situations in which our only options are to give into 
oppressive regimes or suffer horrible consequences. Although the thought of execution, burning 
to death, or the gas chamber might understandably persuade most people to choose oppression, a 
commitment to the complete annihilation of oppression—and the ideal aim of a self-
deconstructive ethic—would have us become the kind of person that would choose otherwise. 
Even if this ideal of complete self-deconstruction is unattainable for most people, it still 
points us in the right direction—assuming the direction we wish to follow is one where we rid 
ourselves from our potential to oppress. From this perspective, we need not all become Buddhas 
before serious strides are made on the path toward ending oppression. Although a Buddha might 
maintain zero propensity to defend a conception of self and thus zero propensity for acts of 
oppression, we all have the capacity to, at least, lessen our propensity for oppression. The ideal 
aim of this account is to transform ourselves into persons with zero potential for oppression, 
                                                             
11 Keown, p. 100‐101. 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however, within this account is also the much more practical aim of working to ensure that our 
potential for oppression becomes increasingly diminished.  
 
 
Section III “The Relevance of Moral Luck 
 
 
3.1 Moral Luck: Reducing Our Potential to Oppress  
The role of moral luck in a self-deconstructive ethic becomes relevant in light of this practical 
aim. For we may have an aim to diminish our potential to oppress, but as long as we possess 
some potential, then we must acknowledge that there are, in fact, some circumstances in which 
we might realize this potential. Whether or not these particular circumstances come to fruition 
does not necessarily depend on anything that we might will; rather, some of these circumstances 
might arise as a matter of circumstantial luck. You and I might have the same potential for 
oppression, however the circumstances I experience result in the realization of this potential, 
whereas you might be lucky enough to go throughout life without this potential ever manifesting. 
Philosopher Allen Buchanan discusses his lucky ascent from a racist upbringing, saying, “to this 
day I tremble at the thought of the moral risk my upbringing imposed on me. Given the right 
circumstances, I might have perpetrated a hate crime.”12 Imagine a man, perhaps Buchanan at 
one time, who maintains as a part of his self-conception the belief that having fair skin is a mark 
of superiority. This kind of belief certainly sets itself up for leading to acts of oppression should 
the man ever meet someone of differing skin color. But, what if he never ends up encountering 
anyone of different skin color, and thus never commits any acts of oppression? A person might 
have a great potential for oppression, but due to circumstantial moral luck, the individual may 
never realize this potential. In contrast, someone with a very low potential for oppression may 
                                                             
12 Buchanan, “Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology.” 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find herself in a circumstance of extremely bad moral luck, in which case she does end up 
realizing her potential to oppress. But, in any case, the best we can do is attempt to uncover what 
it takes to diminish one’s potential for oppression and then continue on that path toward the 
ultimate ideal of complete eradication of our potential to oppress.  
In this case, and according to a self-deconstructive ethic, our potential for oppression is 
bound with our desires for self-preservation. Thus, diminishing our potential to oppress will 
require a diminishment of our desire for self-preservation, and that will require a deconstruction 
of our self-conception. It is clear then that a person possessing a rigid conception of identity will 
have a greater potential for oppression, and a person with a more fluid identity will have less 
potential. This is because a person with a rigid identity is more likely to perceive greater 
numbers of traits or sets of traits that he takes to be fundamental to his own identity; thus, a 
person with a rigid identity is more likely to find himself in situations wherein he has the 
potential to reaffirm or preserve those traits within himself. A person with a fluid identity, 
however, is less likely to perceive that any particular trait is fundamental to her own self-
conception. Therefore, someone with a fluid identity is less likely to be placed in a situation of 
reaffirming or preserving centrally held identity traits. So, the path toward diminishing our 
potential to oppress is marked by movements toward a more fluid identity and away from a more 
rigid identity. Hence it will be important to inquire into the pragmatic elements of cultivating a 
more fluid identity, I will take up this inquiry in §4.  
 
3.2 The Problem of Virtue and Crossing the Great Sea of Luck 
If our potential to oppress manifests itself due to circumstances of moral luck, we might conceive 
of the project of deconstructing our identity as enhancing our capacity to overcome greater 
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instances of luck that would otherwise compel us to act on our desires to oppress. This type of 
project—of enhancing one’s capacity to overcome bad moral luck—can be interpreted as a 
central aim for virtue ethics, as well as a self-deconstructive ethic. Interestingly, one might note 
an inherent tension between the two ethics. On the one hand, virtue ethics is a more explicitly 
positive account; concerned with cultivating virtues through habit, thus constructing the proper 
character that is amicable for human flourishing. In Aristotle’s words, virtuous action must arise 
from, “a firm and unchanging state [of character].”13 A self-deconstructive ethic is much more of 
a negative account, which warns against the cultivation of any trait that we ultimately interpret as 
fundamental to our self-conceptions, including virtuous character. The distinction between the 
two accounts, and the motivation for self-deconstruction instead of the constructivist nature of 
virtue ethics, is best understood once we examine how virtues are intended as means for 
overcoming moral luck in context of ending oppression. 
 Aristotle, himself, did not straightforwardly discuss the cultivation of virtues as a means 
of overcoming moral luck. But, in certain areas of Nicomachean Ethics, his argument seems to 
suggest that this is at least a part of what our virtues do. For instance, Aristotle certainly talks 
about the role of luck in terms of our capacity to achieve flourishing. John M. Cooper discusses 
the relationship between “goods of fortune” and Aristotle’s ethics, indicating that at least one 
form of luck (i.e. the luck of attaining certain goods in life) holds determinative weight on our 
potential for flourishing.14 Further, Aristotle purports one virtue, in particular, as the “crown” of 
all other virtues, and this is the virtue of magnanimity.15 And in Aristotle’s description of the 
magnanimous person, he is one who has a greater capacity to overcome the circumstances of 
luck, as Aristotle says the magnanimous person, “will…bear himself with moderation towards 
                                                             
13 Ed. Welchman, p. 25. 
14 Cooper, “Aristotle on the Goods of Fortune.” 
15 Aristotle, Book IV chapter 3. 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wealth and power and all good or evil fortune, whatever may befall him, and will be neither 
overjoyed by good fortune nor over-pained by evil.” This description seems to suggest that 
whether or not Aristotle explicitly mentions a purpose of virtue as a means of overcoming the 
greater circumstances of luck, it seems that he thinks this is a relatively apparent function of our 
virtue imbued on us by one of the ultimate virtues, magnanimity.16  
Then, one might ask: If Aristotle’s constructionist view enables us to overcome instances 
of moral luck, then for what motivation would we choose to adopt a self-deconstructive ethic 
which purports to accomplish the same thing? The most obvious answer, perhaps, is that while 
both views aim at helping one to overcome instances of moral luck, each view does so with 
different ultimate ends in mind. For Aristotle, overcoming luck and attaining virtue is for the end 
of human flourishing, whereas a self-deconstructive ethics is more concerned with ending human 
oppression. But, nevertheless, it seems that both projects cannot be taken up at the same time. If 
compelled, one would have to choose which project to take up over the other: the self-
constructive view of virtue ethics, or the self-deconstructive view proposed here. This choice 
poses a moral dilemma—is it morally better to promote human flourishing or is there a greater 
moral requirement on us to eliminate oppression? I am not exactly sure what the answer is, 
although it is a compelling question. What I do believe to be true, however, is that the goal of 
eliminating oppression is fundamentally jeopardized by Aristotelian’s account of virtue and 
flourishing. And this, assuming that we value the ending of oppression, gives us good reason to 
be wary of adopting Aristotle’s constructivist view.  
                                                             
16 Further, contemporary philosophers such as Lisa Tessman, offer more explicit discussions regarding the role of 
virtue and overcoming the kinds of moral luck that shapes our character (constitutive moral luck) and thus has the 
potential of enabling or inhibiting our subjection to oppression (thus altering our capacities to flourish). See 
Tessman, Burdened Virtues.  
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To see why, consider an analogy inspired by the famous Buddhist parable of “the raft”. 
Imagine that you are on one side of an open channel of water. Across the channel is another 
shore, and this shore represents one of your desired ends; in this case, the end that awaits you is 
the elimination of oppression. The sea of water in between you and this end represents the 
circumstances of moral luck that could prevent you from crossing the channel and reaching your 
end. According to a self-deconstructive ethic, the traits that form our rigid conceptions of identity 
are like weights that pull you down as you attempt to cross the water. The more rigid one’s 
identity, the more likely one will succumb to the “sea” of moral luck and fail to achieve the end 
of ending oppression. Conversely, if we achieve a more fluid conception of identity, we will 
have a greater capacity to rise above the sea of luck in order to achieve our end. In the Buddhist 
parable, a man seeks to cross a river, and fashions a raft in order to do so. Once the man has 
safely crossed the river on his raft, the Buddha asks whether or not it would be rational for the 
man to carry this raft on his back wherever he might go. But, of course, the raft is only as good 
as its purposes of helping us cross the river, and it only harms us (weighs us down) if we hold 
onto it otherwise. So the Buddha says, “I have taught doctrine similar to a raft—it is for crossing 
over, and not for carrying.”17 Developing virtues as a means of overcoming moral luck is similar 
to the man who continues to carry his raft once he has crossed the channel. Holding onto our 
virtues as unchangeable states of character can only harm us once our end of eliminating 
oppression is met. For, if we are willing to value our virtues, in and of themselves, apart from the 
end to which they are meant to accomplish (which, in this case, is the end of eliminating 
oppression) then our virtues might instill contrary motivations in us that could jeopardize our 
pursuit of this end.  
                                                             
17 Excerpt derived from Rahula, What the Buddha Taught pp. 11‐12. 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For example, consider a physician. In fact, consider a great physician. She possesses all 
the necessary virtues for achieving her professional end of curing illness, including: medical 
wisdom, patience, and tactical precision. Now, let us assume that her end becomes fully 
achieved—all the members of her community are perfectly healthy. If she values her position as 
a physician (along with the necessary virtues that accompany such a role) in itself, then she 
would have motivation to act contrary toward her ultimate professional aim of eliminating all 
sickness. She may be less willing to seek cures for disease, or more willing to exaggerate her 
expertise. As Allen Buchanan describes, people who come to “identify with their expertise,” are, 
“prone to exaggerate its usefulness.”18  Similarly valuing a virtue such as generosity, in and of 
itself, means valuing it—substantiating it—a part from the desired end that it is meant to achieve. 
If there is no one left to be charitable for, does this mean that I must seek to create instances of 
charity? Must I also be committed to the project of keeping people poor? It seems that valuing 
charity in and of itself runs the danger of lending two contradicting motivations if our ultimate 
end is the elimination of suffering. For, valuing a virtue like charity in and of itself would have 
us also value that people remain poor and in need of our help. A self-deconstructive ethic, 
however, avoids such rigid conceptions of what is valuable as part of our character, and instead 
focuses on the pragmatic steps we can take toward achieving our ultimate end of ending 
oppression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
18 Buchanan, p. 104. 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Section IV “The Role of Rational Self-Reflection” 
 
4.1 Addressing a Metaphysical Issue 
My aim in this section is to explore the role of rational self-reflection in the project of ending our 
own internal potential for oppression, and also how we might draw on the capacity for rational 
self-reflection as a moral standard within our institutions for similar purposes. But, before I go 
on, I will address a metaphysical worry that might arise if this project is taken too literally. For to 
say that rational self-reflection is useful moral capacity in the project of cultivating a more fluid 
identity is to say something about the role of reason in the process of self-deconstruction. 
Reason, or reasoning, is our mental capacity to pursue and acquire truths. Then, to conjecture 
that reason has role in the process of self-deconstruction might lead one to assume that, as a 
matter of truth, the self can be deconstructed. As discussed before, on an ideal interpretation, this 
ethic would have us commit to a complete deconstruction of our identities, such that there would 
be no circumstances in which we would be willing to preserve our self-conceptions at the sake of 
another’s expense. On this interpretation, serious metaphysical consequences arise if it is true 
that our identities can be deconstructed to such an extreme. For if rational reflection is meant to 
bring us closer toward ultimately true conclusions, then the truth, according to an ideal 
interpretation, would ultimately imply that there is no self.  As such, this conclusion might be 
taken as a seriously radical metaphysical posit. On the other hand, the practical interpretation of 
this ethic says that it is within most of our capacities to deconstruct our identities to at least some 
greater extent. Thus, pursuing our capacities for rational self-reflection need not lead us to the 
extreme view that there is no self, instead it might lead us to the truth that while the self may not 
be completely deconstructible, the self is far more deconstructible than what we might otherwise 
think.  
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I have yet to argue for or against the plausibility that the self can, as a matter of truth, be 
entirely deconstructed. But as it turns out, for the purposes of this argument, I do not have to. 
The metaphysical issue can be sidestepped. For, my interpretation of the word “identity” (a term 
that often carries with it its own weight of metaphysical baggage), is simply one’s self-
conception of oneself; that which is included in what one thinks of herself as. So then, even if a 
personhood theorist defends some conglomeration of characteristics that are thought to be 
fundamental for personal identity, this may not, necessarily, be the same conglomeration of 
characteristics of which one includes in her own self-conception of herself. In other words, that 
which makes me the same person through time is not necessarily that which I include in my self-
conception. The two may certainly overlap—for instance, I may believe, as Derek Parfit does19, 
that my personal identity depends on a kind of psychological connectedness of memories and 
experiences, and although I might value this kind of connectedness in my own self-conception, I 
might include other things too: the way my body is shaped, the hometown I live in, or the 
activities I excel in. My point here is to acknowledge that what we conceive of as ourselves, and 
thus the things we would be willing to preserve and defend, may be related and yet very much 
separate from the characteristics that are purported to define a theoretical account of identity.  
 
4.2 Reflection as Deconstruction, A Socratic Pursuit 
On moving toward a more fluid identity, our moral capacity for rational self-reflection holds 
promise as a tool in deconstructing the self and lending a more fluid identity. When we reflect on 
our circumstances, rationally, we attempt to discern the truth of our experience from what is 
false. Someone might try to tell me that I am incompetent, or that I will never amount to 
anything in life. Without at least some capacity for rational reflection, I might have taken these 
                                                             
19 Parfit,  Reasons and Persons. 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statements for truth. But, in reflection I am able to realize that these claims have no sound basis, 
they are just the mere opinion of others. The goal is to let these “defining” claims pass through 
us, to avoid letting the assumptions of our character “instantiate” us. As the Buddha says, 
“similar to a raft, [you] should give up even good things; how much more then should you give 
up evil things.” It is not that we should not become proud when we do good, or feel remorse 
when we do bad, it is just that there is no need to construct rigid forms of identity based on who 
we perceive ourselves to be—good or bad. Virtually every one of us has the capacity, upon self-
reflection, to deconstruct certain traits that we take to be fundamental in our selves, and thus 
facilitate a more fluid conception of our own identity.  
We can conduct our own self-reflective though experiment right now: First, imagine a 
trait belonging to you that, if lost, would lead you to experience internal anguish over its loss. At 
first, try not to imagine something that is all too serious or life-threatening. Remember, we do 
not have to be willing to stare death in the face right away. Our practical purpose is to start by 
letting go of the little things. The best traits to begin imagining are those little things that have 
large influence over how we perceive ourselves. I think a big (or little) one for many people is 
having hair. I can empathize with the almost absurd amount of anguish involved in losing one’s 
hair. After you have some trait in mind, imagine that by some circumstance of luck, the trait is 
lost to you forever and imagine how such a loss would make you feel.  It might seem odd that 
something as seemingly non-essential as not having hair could cause us so much despair. The 
point of this thought experiment is to have us reflect on the different ways in which we include 
things—even obviously insubstantial things—into our self-conceptions. It would seem that there 
is certainly not much good reason to feel so hurt or threatened by such a small loss of a 
characteristic that is associated with our person.  
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Thought experiments like these resonate within a certain Socratic tradition. And, we 
should look toward this Socratic wisdom in order to understand how rational self-reflection 
seems to lead to an inherently self-deconstructive path of understanding.  A line given by 
Socrates in Plato’s Phaedo has, at least for me, summarized the wisdom in Socrates’ philosophic 
approach. He says, “The one aim of those who practice philosophy…is to practice for dying and 
death.”20 In context, there is a literal relevance in this advice since Socrates is quite literally 
awaiting his death. But, if Socrates meant what he said, and he thought the aim of philosophy 
was to practice death, then perhaps his more famous philosophical strategies can be interpreted 
from this perspective, as well. The elenchus, for instance, was an argumentative method that 
sought to deconstruct another’s position by means eliciting a process of self-reflection—forcing 
other’s to examine the foundations of their own arguments. On one interpretation, you might say 
that Socrates was merely deconstructing the flawed arguments of his opponents. On this 
interpretation Socrates’ larger “aim” is merely a pursuit of logical clarity. However, on another 
interpretation, we could see Socrates as not just deconstructing his opponents’ arguments, but as 
deconstructing them. I find this latter interpretation more appealing. For, a recurring theme in the 
Socratic Dialogues is the fervent (and ultimately violent) defenses in response to such forced 
introspection. So it seems that Socrates deals in the deconstructive challenge of defeating pride 
as much as he deals in the challenge of defeating arguments. And it makes sense that these two 
challenges go hand-in-hand: a defeat of one’s pride and defeat of one’s argument. I think, for 
many of us, the desire to “be correct” or to “be a knowledgeable person” is a common 
characteristic in our self-conceptions; that is, more often than not, it is a trait rigidly fixed in our 
identities. We should see the method of elenchus, then, as a powerful tool in which might enable 
us to subdue our pride and help us to cultivate more fluid identities.  
                                                             
20 Phaedo (64a), Ed. C.D.C. Reeve. 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4. 3 Reflection and Elements of a Self-Deconstructive Ethic within Our Institutions  
Most of the previous discussion has applied to interpersonal circumstances of oppression 
wherein a person is much more likely to be, at least somewhat, aware of their harmful actions. 
But a large amount of oppression is perpetuated unconsciously, in consequence of systemic 
barriers and by way of our institutional structures—the ways in which we create polling districts 
can disenfranchise certain populations of people; and seeing only posters of white, thin, models 
might implicitly affect our standards of normative beauty, which might weaken the self-worth of 
“non-conforming” populations of people. Institutions undoubtedly play a role in forming the 
kind of moral luck we experience and are subjected to; in the ways that they shape our 
opportunities, the kinds of information we gather and how we come to perceive ourselves and 
others in this world—all of which are relevant in our pursuit to rid ourselves of the potential to 
oppress. The elements of a deconstructive ethics thus far have offered some explanation 
regarding how we ought to end the potential to oppress within our selves. However, if we are to 
take the project of ending oppression seriously, then we ought to address the ways in which we 
can diminish institutional perpetuation of oppression.  
To do this, I do not think we must stray too far from the groundwork that has already 
been laid. Let me recall certain elements of the self-deconstructive ethic that have been discussed 
thus far. First, this ethic is founded on an ultimate aspiration of ending oppression (§2.1). 
Second, ending oppression will require ending our potential to oppress, and ending our potential 
to oppress will depend on our commitment to fostering greater fluidity within our self-
conceptions (§2.3). Third, any characteristic of our self that is valued in and of itself (e.g. virtues, 
or professional titles) carries the risk of instilling in us a contradiction in motivation between the 
valued characteristic and our commitment to ending oppression (§3.2). And finally, our moral 
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capacity for self-reflection allows us to critically examine the kinds of things we take to be 
fundamental in our self-conceptions, and it gives us the opportunity to reflect on our attachments 
to our pride and eventually allows us to subdue such self-conceptions (§4.2). The strategy I 
propose in reducing systemic oppression is to, more or less, apply these elements of the self-
deconstructive ethic (all of which, thus far, have only been raised in the context of interpersonal 
oppression) to the standards that we come to accept within the structures of our institutions.  
Regarding the first element, we should assume that all institutional aims (e.g. gaining 
profit, lending services) are restricted by a more fundamental side constraint of reducing their 
potential for perpetuating oppression and harm.21 And, for many institutions, reducing 
oppression is more than a side constraint; it is a fundamental goal to be promoted. We assume, 
for instance, that institutions of medicine have a goal of eliminating suffering and sickness. 
Naturally our medical systems will strive to avoid causing oppression and harm more generally. 
And, our government, similarly, has a fundamental goal of protecting its citizens from harm, 
oppression or otherwise. It is true that the government, and other institutions, must be careful not 
to protect against some harms such that they perpetuate worse ones; yet, their ultimate aim is a 
commitment to the reduction of harm. Even our military (as an extension of our government), is 
an institution that has (or certainly should have) a fundamental goal of reducing harm and 
oppression. It would be awful, for instance, to imagine a military that instigates harm and 
encourages oppressive regimes. Hopefully, our military strives to end violence—even if it 
chooses to employ violence to do so. But, even when an institution does not naturally possess a 
                                                             
21 Here, I include “oppression and harm,” for while the reduction of general forms of human harm (as opposed to 
the more specific harm of oppression) is not necessarily included as an ultimate aspiration in the previous 
discussion of this account, I do think it is an aim that should be adopted in our institutions. For, any harm that an 
institution inflicts on its participants will be more likely to trigger one’s desires for self‐preservation, thus 
facilitating the perpetuation of oppression among its participants (recall discussion in §2.2) 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goal of reducing suffering (e.g. a bank, perhaps), we still should expect that this institution 
comply with the side restraint of not contributing to oppression.  
I will skip ahead, for a moment, to the third element of this ethic: avoiding contradictions 
of motivation against our ultimate aims. Our institutions should similarly be structured in such a 
way as to avoid contradictions in organizational motivation that would compel its participants to 
act contrary to the fundamental institutional aim of reducing oppression and suffering. When it is 
the case that organizational motivations are put in place that contradict with other, more 
fundamental aims, we might refer to this as a contradiction in teleology. For instance, hospitals 
have a fundamental aim to reduce suffering. However, hospitals have other aims, like the aim to 
increase capital. A contradiction in teleology arises when the aim to produce capital conflicts 
with the aim to end suffering. For instance, consider a medical system that incentivizes sickness, 
in lieu of promoting health. This is a recent shift in practice that N. Ann Davis describes: 
There has thus been a wholesale retreat from the early twentieth century commitment to 
pursue preventative and environmental strategies to promote public health in favor of a 
focus on treating ill individuals, which is surely more profitable for the insurance and 
pharmaceutical industries. 
 
 Surely a hospital’s more fundamental aim of reducing sickness and suffering is contradicted 
when we incentivize the very thing that we are trying to end. A deconstructive ethic requires that 
all institutions uphold a superceding aim of reducing oppression and harm, all additional 
institutional motivations should not contradict, but should be compatible with, institutional aims 
of avoiding the perpetuation of oppression and human harm more generally.  
The fourth element discusses the importance of rational self-reflection in ending 
oppression. Similar to Socrates’ elenchus, we should direct strategies of critical examination and 
self-reflection toward our institutions and the information they convey to us. For if we are not 
overly critical of our institutions, then our institutional setting may shape us, or instill messages 
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in us that are contrary to our end project of freeing ourselves from the potential to oppress. As 
Allen Buchanan warns, “a person brought up in a racist society typically not only absorbs an 
interwoven set of false beliefs about the natural characteristics of blacks, but also learns 
epistemic vices that make it hard for him to come to see the falsity of these beliefs.”22 Both 
Davis and Buchanan advocate similar solutions when trying to avoid the risks that are incurred 
on us due to these “socially inculcated”23 beliefs. Whether in the context of our larger society or 
within the context of our institutional structures, we should create social environments that are 
“friendly to Socrates,”24 wherein a person is a part of a “social ambiance”25 that instantiates 
necessary freedoms and channels available to him to express concerns and question authority 
when appropriate. 
A self-deconstructive ethic, then, suggests that we should not only see rational self-
reflection as a useful tool in our own pursuits of identity deconstruction, but we should also 
abstract this capacity on the kinds of social reflections to which we are all subjected. That is, in 
the same way the Socrates employed critical self-reflection as a means of self-deconstruction, 
our institutional standards and systems should be subjected to the same sort of critical evaluation 
and transparency.  
The second element, regarding our need to foster fluidity in our self-conceptions, may not 
translate into a specific standard that we can place on our institutions. But the hope is that if we 
apply the standards derived from the other three elements (reducing an institutions capacity for 
harm, avoiding institutional contradictions in teleology and encouraging social epistemological 
processes of self-reflection) then, at the very least, we may mitigate the constraints our 
                                                             
22 Buchanan, p. 96. 
23 Buchanan, 96. 
24 A phrase lent to me from Dr. Kristen Hessler 
25 Davis, 98. 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institutions may place on us regarding our project of self-deconstruction, giving the participants 
within those institutions the space, freedom and confidence that is encouraging toward the 
process of self-deconstruction.  
 
 
 
Section V “Conclusion” 
 
 
Thinking about this self-deconstructive ethic analytically and philosophically was particularly 
challenging, because the ideas motivating this ethic came from a place in my heart and life 
experience. Luckily, as a gay man, I have never experienced any significantly terrible harms of 
oppression; I have never been assaulted, or discriminated in the work place. However, the 
heteronormative standards of our society were made clear to me at a very young age. And, living 
through adolescents with the internal suspicion that I was gay, was nearly unbearable. In my 
darker moments, I considered whether or not it would be better to die than to live a life in which 
everything that I had come to value would be stricken from me: a normal family and my own 
children, social respect, a chance at a political career, perhaps even the love and admiration of 
my friends and family. A perception of loss to that magnitude is overwhelming, especially for a 
young person. Many people certainly spoke as if “fags” were worthless, but worse yet, I began to 
believe in my own insignificance. And, interestingly, although I considered myself to be a 
friendly and open-minded person, whenever I encountered someone else who I perceived to be 
gay, anger would spontaneously erupt inside of me. It seemed that a part of me hated them, 
although I did my best to suppress it.  
 When you finally overcome that kind of internal anguish, a part of you dies. Someone 
that you always thought you were no longer exists. But in that absence of a self-conception there 
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is a sense of freedom—of liberation. And so much of the pain and hatred simply vanish. There is 
great transformative power in coming to terms with self-deconstruction. I set out to 
philosophically capture the essence of this power and the relationship between our identity and 
oppression, and I used my own experience as a starting point. Unfortunately, there is much left to 
explore here. What I have tried to do is capture the general picture of oppression, what causes us 
to oppress, and how we can end it. Oppression, itself though, is an elusive and complex 
phenomenon. And there is room to consider the nuances of such a phenomenon and whether or 
not a self-deconstructive ethic is adequate in addressing all forms of oppression that we might 
encounter. However, as I have found in my own life, the truth of this account is best understood 
when it is experienced and practiced. The project is certainly frightening, for a letting go of the 
self is, in a sense, embracing death. But, I take comfort in the words of the Tibetan Book of the 
Dead, “thou needst not be afraid. The Lords of Death are thine own hallucinations.”26  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
26 Evans‐Wentz, p. 166‐167. 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